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ntil recently, conventional wisdom held that antitrust law 
should help ensure that patentholders honor their commitments 
to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) to charge a reasonable 
royalty.1 Like many conventional wisdoms, this one has been turned 
on its head since Donald Trump’s ascent to power. Trump appointed 
Makan Delrahim to be his Assistant Attorney General for the 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Delrahim was an early 
supporter of Trump’s presidential candidacy and served on Trump’s 
presidential transition team.  
The Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for the Antitrust Division 
has historically used his or her position to advocate for greater 
competition in the American economy. Many past AAGs have used 
their time in office to focus on a particular policy passion, such as 
targeting hard-core, price-fixing cartels or improving the process for 
evaluating the anticompetitive effects of mergers and acquisitions. 
Trump’s AAG for Antitrust has chosen a less obvious hobbyhorse to 
be his signature policy imperative: providing antitrust immunity to 
patent owners who acquire monopoly power by lying to standard-
setting organizations. 
Since assuming the office in September 2017, Delrahim has used his 
position to defend the deception of patentholders who lie to standard-
setting organizations in order to acquire monopoly power and then 
charge a monopoly royalty, despite their promises not to. This form of 
misconduct is called patent holdup.2 In a series of five major speeches 
1 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 312 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007); Apple Inc. 
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2012 WL 1672493, *7 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (“recogniz[ing]
that fraudulent FRAND declarations that are used to induce SSOs to adopt standards
essential patents can be monopoly conduct for the purposes of establishing a Section 2
claim.”) (quoting Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL
4948567, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011)); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2011 WL
4948567, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (“Courts have recognized that fraudulent FRAND
declarations that are used to induce SSOs to adopt standards essential patents can be
monopoly conduct for the purposes of establishing a Section 2 claim.”); Research in Motion
Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 796–97 (N.D. Tex. 2008); George S. Cary et
al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting,
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 945 (2011) (“Patent holdup where a patentee has deceived an SSO
in order to secure a position in the standard is, at its core, an antitrust problem.”).
2 Patent lock-in refers to the scenario in which manufacturers invest significant resources 
to make standard-compliant products and the switching costs are sufficiently high that the 
manufacturers “become ‘locked in’ to the standard.” Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 310. 
Some commentators distinguish between patent lock-in and patent holdup, defining the 
latter as lock-in combined with surprise. This Article does not make this distinction. Instead, 
holdup is viewed as an example of lock-in whereby implementers who make standard-
U 
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from November 2017 through December 2018, Delrahim has 
strenuously argued that antitrust law should play no role in deterring or 
remedying patent holdup, even when a patentholder affirmatively 
misleads an SSO in order to convince it to adopt a standard that requires 
licenses from that patentholder.3 Delrahim has given more public 
speeches defending patentholders’ deception than on any other area of 
antitrust policy. 
Through these speeches, Delrahim has sought to dismantle antitrust 
law as a check on patent holdup, even when patentholders illegally 
charge a monopoly price or seek to use injunctions to prevent the 
manufacture of high-tech products that must conform to industry 
standards. Beyond making academic arguments, Delrahim has used 
these speeches to renounce the Antitrust Division’s endorsement 
of policy guidelines, issued with the Patent and Trademark Office, 
which recognize the dangers of patent holdup and the role of antitrust 
law in deterring and remedying patent holdup.4 In these speeches, 
compliant products are locked into manufacturing products that read on standard-essential 
patents. 
3 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
“Telegraph Road”: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and Antitrust 
Law 4 (Dec. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Delrahim, Telegraph Road], https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
speech/file/1117686/download [https://perma.cc/57MX-ULJ9]; Makan Delrahim, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Law and Patent Licensing in the 
New Wild West 5 (Sept. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Delrahim, Wild West], https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/speech/file/1095011/download [https://perma.cc/6ZCN-TZRP]; Makan Delrahim, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Long Run: Maximizing 
Innovation Incentives Through Advocacy and Enforcement 3 (Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter 
Delrahim, The Long Run], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1050956/download 
[https://perma.cc/3SUN-3D78]; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property 
Law 5 (Mar. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Delrahim, New Madison], https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/speech/file/1044316/download [https://perma.cc/A3TN-N7MJ]; Makan Delrahim, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Take It to the Limit: Respecting 
Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law 7 (Nov. 10, 2017) (transcript 
available at the Office of Public Affairs) [hereinafter Delrahim, Take It to the Limit], 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download [https://perma.cc/65ED-26YM]. 
4 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT 
ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND 
COMMITMENTS (2013) [hereinafter Joint Policy Statement], https://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
page/file/1118381/download [https://perma.cc/TK9X-DJ5S]. In his December 2018 
Stanford speech, Delrahim unilaterally withdrew the Antitrust Division’s assent to the 2013 
Joint Policy Statement. Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 6–7.  
As this Article was going to press, the DOJ and PTO, along with the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, issued a new policy statement. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-
ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS (Dec. 19, 2019), 
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Delrahim invokes the familiar concepts of innovation and competition. 
Although some of his claims are facially persuasive, upon closer 
inspection, Delrahim’s arguments are problematic for three reasons. 
First, his arguments fundamentally misconstrue the nature of 
competition in the standard-setting context. Second, Delrahim’s 
arguments undermine antitrust principles. Finally, his arguments 
reward illegal monopolists with the twin rights of charging monopoly 
prices and of preventing firms from manufacturing products until they 
submit to the monopolist’s demands. 
This Article analyzes Delrahim’s speeches and the Antitrust 
Division’s new deception-forgiving policy to show that Delrahim’s 
premises and reasoning are demonstrably false. Part One of the Article 
explains the importance of standards in modern economies. Without 
standards, many high-tech products could not exist in their present 
form. Industry participants need to agree on uniform standards in order 
to ensure network interoperability. These standards are created and 
implemented through standard-setting organizations that, through their 
members, compare competing technologies in order to determine 
which combination of technology will allow manufacturers to produce 
the most cost-efficient, high-quality products for consumers. Many 
individual standards require using hundreds of patented inventions in 
order to comply with the standard. And many products, such as cell 
phones and computers, require compliance with dozens of standards. 
This means that many common products read on thousands of patents. 
After a standard has been adopted and becomes entrenched in an 
industry, an unscrupulous owner of a standard-essential patent (SEP) 
could threaten to sue manufacturers and enjoin them from making 
standard-compliant products unless the manufacturers pay an 
exorbitant royalty, a royalty based on the value of the standard as 
opposed to the incremental value of the SEP. This form of misconduct 
is called “patent holdup.” In order to combat this threat, most SSOs 
require their members to disclose, during the standard-setting process 
and before the standard is chosen, all their relevant intellectual property 
(IP) rights and to commit to charging a royalty that is fair, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) if one or more of their protected 
inventions is incorporated into the standard. Some patent owners, 
however, lie to SSOs and promise to never charge a non-FRAND 
royalty but then charge a monopoly royalty after the standard that 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SEP%20policy%20statement%20sign
ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMT5-2Y33].  
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includes their patented invention has been adopted and implemented 
industrywide. 
Part Two lays out the basic case for why monopolization through 
deception followed by FRAND violations is an antitrust issue. After 
explaining the fundamentals of monopolization law, this Part 
shows how FRAND violations by monopolist patentholders constitute 
anticompetitive conduct, as that phrase is used in antitrust law. 
Competition in the standard-setting context is multifaceted. The 
standard-setting process begins with competition for the standard and 
is followed by competition within the standard, as standard-compliant 
products compete against each other in the retail market. This Part 
shows how abuse of the FRAND framework can distort the competitive 
process. 
Part Three presents the arguments Delrahim advances to support his 
position that deception by patentholders toward SSOs, followed by 
FRAND violations, should be held to not violate antitrust law. First, he 
emphasizes the rights of patentholders, including their general right to 
seek injunctive relief against infringers. Second, he argues that owners 
of SEPs who ignore their FRAND commitments are not engaged in 
conduct that antitrust law cares about. Third, he presents a litany of 
horribles that he asserts would happen if antitrust law applied to 
FRAND violations, including the destruction of innovation, the 
imposition of compulsory licensing, and the creation of an antitrust 
duty to deal. Fourth, he attempts to distract from the harms of FRAND 
violations by implying that the real problems are the SSOs themselves, 
who are ganging up on poor patentholders, and federal judges, who are 
ill-equipped to adjudicate FRAND issues. Finally, Delrahim argues 
that FRAND violations should not fall within the reach of antitrust law 
because patent law and contract law are better suited to address these 
issues. All these arguments are deeply flawed, and some are downright 
disingenuous. This Part also analyzes and disproves Delrahim’s 
asserted justifications for withdrawing antitrust law from the arena of 
FRAND violations. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the problems of lock-in 
and deception are not necessarily synonymous. It is theoretically 
possible for a patent-owning firm to make a FRAND commitment 
during the standard-setting process with the intention of honoring its 
word. After the standard is adopted and widely implemented—and the 
patentee now owns a standard-essential patent—the firm may have a 
change of heart, perhaps following a change in management. After 
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manufacturers are locked into the standard, the firm may engage in 
an opportunistic breach of contract by demanding a higher-than-
FRAND royalty. Delrahim, however, does not distinguish between 
unpremeditated holdup and ex ante deception as part of a premeditated 
holdup scheme. Instead, he defends patentholders’ deception as 
conduct that does not raise antitrust concerns. As this Article is a 
refutation of Delrahim’s speeches, it focuses primarily on patent 
holdup that arises from deception. 
I 
STANDARD SETTING, PATENT HOLDUP, AND FRAND COMMITMENTS 
Most of today’s technologically complex products—from cell 
phones to digital assistants—require competing manufacturers to 
conform to industry-recognized standards.5 This is because, as former 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chair Edith Ramirez explained, 
“Firms in the information technology and telecommunications 
industries frequently face the problem that hundreds, thousands, and 
sometimes hundreds of thousands of different claimed inventions need 
to work together in a single device and in multiple devices operating 
together within a system.”6 In order to ensure compatibility among 
products and the various networks the products use, technological 
standards are necessary.7 Without standards, an “industry would 
balkanize, improvements would slow, and consumers would suffer.”8 
Indeed, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the FTC have 
recognized that such “standards are widely acknowledged to be one of 
the engines driving the modern economy.”9 
5 Standards can include structural components as well as patented methods. See 
generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001 
passim (2017) (discussing the unique nature of patenting methods without tangible 
components). 
6 Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-
Essential Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) 
[hereinafter Ramirez] (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Federal Trade Commission), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-
federal-trade-commission-concerning-oversight-impact-competition-exclusion-orders/ 
120711standardpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ73-C7QT].  
7 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Without 
standards, there would be no guarantee that a particular set of headphones, for example, 
would work with one’s personal music player.”). 
8 Intel Corp. v. Via Techs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 
(2007), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ4F-
ZB38]. 
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Although standards may evolve organically, most technical 
standards are adopted through standard-setting organizations after 
much deliberation and consideration of the various alternatives 
available.10 In January 2013, the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) jointly 
issued their Policy Statement on Remedies For Standards-Essential 
Patents Subject to Voluntary F/Rand Commitments,11 which 
recognized the following: 
Voluntary consensus standards serve the public interest in a 
variety of ways, from helping protect public health and safety 
to promoting efficient resource allocation and production by 
facilitating interoperability among complementary products. 
Interoperability standards have paved the way for moving many 
important innovations into the marketplace, including the complex 
communications networks and sophisticated mobile computing 
devices that are hallmarks of the modern age. Indeed, voluntary 
consensus standards, whether mechanical, electrical, computer-
related, or communications-related, have incorporated important 
technical advances that are fundamental to the interoperability of 
many of the products on which consumers have come to rely.12  
These SSO-generated standards “can create enormous value for 
consumers by increasing competition, innovation, product quality, and 
choice.”13  
The adoption of standards benefits all categories of market 
participants. Patentholders have the opportunity to advocate for a 
standard that includes their patented technology, which could generate 
a stream of royalties from those who comply with the standard. The 
manufacturers—often referred to as implementers—have the benefit of 
a clear standard that allows them to make products for which there will 
be consumer demand. Finally, consumers benefit from being able to 
buy standard-compliant, interoperable products from manufacturers 
who compete against each other in a competitive market. 
Once a standard is adopted, however, it may confer monopoly power 
on certain patentholders, particularly those entities that own so-called 
standard-essential patents, which are necessary in order to make 
10 Brad Biddle et al., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards in the 
Information and Communications Technology Industry, 52 JURIMETRICS 177, 180 (2012). 
11 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 4. 
12 Id. at 3–4. 
13 Ramirez, supra note 6, at 4. 
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standard-compliant products.14 A single product or system can involve 
thousands of SEPs15 because some standards can require 
manufacturers to secure rights to hundreds or thousands of patents.16 
And some products, such as personal computers, entail compliance 
with over a hundred standards.17 
After the standard has been adopted and implemented, the owners 
of SEPs may attempt to extort unreasonable royalties from 
manufacturers by threatening to deny them licenses or by suing them 
for infringement if they continue to make standard-compliant products. 
This is classic “patent holdup.”18 Holdup occurs because, absent a 
constraint, the unethical patentholder can demand royalties based on 
the value of the standard, as opposed to the value of its particular 
patents.19 By engaging in patent holdup, it is possible that a patentee 
14 Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies 
Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 889 (2011) (“A patent owner that asserts a patent against a 
standardized product may have monopoly power in a relevant technology market solely by 
virtue of the patented technology having been incorporated into the standard.”). 
15 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 1992 (2007) (“As a striking example, literally thousands of patents have been 
identified as essential to the proposed new standards for 3G cellular telephone systems.”) 
(citing David J. Goodman & Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS NETWORKS, 
COMMUNICATIONS AND MOBILE COMPUTING 2 (2005)); A. Douglas Melamed & Carl 
Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE 
L.J. 2110, 2113 (2018) (“Standards involving information and communications technology
can involve hundreds or even thousands of SEPs, many with uncertain boundaries for
infringement.”).
16 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *11 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“Standards can require the use of hundreds or thousands of 
SEPs held by dozens of patent holders.”); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 1992 (“In 
the information technology sector in particular, modern products such as microprocessors, 
cell phones, or memory devices can easily be covered by dozens or even hundreds of 
different patents.”). 
17 Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *11 (“High-tech products can comply with 
dozens or even hundreds of different standards. For example, a typical personal computer 
(‘PC’) implements as many as 90 different formal standards and over 100 informal 
interoperability standards.”). 
18 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The 
tactic of withholding a license unless and until a manufacturer agrees to pay an unduly high 
royalty rate for an SEP is referred to as ‘hold-up.’”) (citing Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 
Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and 
Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 87, 104 (2007) (“[I]n the typical ‘holdup’ case, the firm 
waits until the standard has been adopted and then surprises participants by asserting the IP 
right and demanding royalties from those that cannot comply with the standard without 
infringement.”). 
19 Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (“The ability of a holder of an SEP to 
demand more than the value of its patented technology and to attempt to capture the value 
of the standard itself is referred to as patent ‘hold-up.’”); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, 
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with a patent on a single component in a multi-part product could 
extract the lion’s share of the entire product’s value.20 After the 
standard is entrenched, the SEP owner has leverage that it did not enjoy 
before standardization.21 SEP owners can effectively engage in holdup 
because the manufacturers have made significant investments in the 
standard and switching to a new standard would be cost prohibitive.22 
The costs of patent holdup are often significant. For example, Motorola 
once insisted upon a royalty that was 150 times more than what a 
federal court later determined to be the reasonable royalty for their 
patents. Similarly, LSI demanded a royalty that was more than 500 
times the court-determined reasonable royalty.23 
Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV 15-2370 JVS(DFMx), 2018 WL 4488286, 
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018) (“Hold up occurs when a patent holder seeks to extract more 
for the use of his patent than the value which his patent adds to a standard.”); Michel, supra 
note 14, at 891 (“At that point, a firm with a patent reading on the standard may have 
monopoly power in the relevant technology market. If so, the patentee can demand a royalty 
that reflects not only the ex ante value of the technology compared to alternatives, but also 
the value associated with investments made to implement the standard.”). 
20 See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public 
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39 (2012). 
21 Microsoft Corp., 795 F.3d at 1030–31 (“[O]nce a standard becomes widely adopted, 
SEP holders obtain substantial leverage over new product developers, who have little choice 
but to incorporate SEP technologies into their products.”); Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 
2111217, at *10 (“When the standard becomes widely used, the holders of SEPs obtain 
substantial leverage to demand more than the value of their specific patented technology.”). 
22 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Industry 
participants who have invested significant resources developing products and technologies 
that conform to the standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their investment 
and switch to another standard. They will have become ‘locked in’ to the standard.”); 
Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (“The threat of hold-up increases as the 
standard becomes more widely implemented and firms make sunk cost investments that 
cannot be recovered if they are forced to forego implementation of the standard or the 
standard is changed.”); Cary et al., supra note 1, at 914 (“Consequently, standardization 
necessarily entails the exclusion of alternative technologies, and can lock an industry into 
one method of doing things for an extended period of time, especially where there are 
significant network effects.”); Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 616–17 (2007) (“Moving from one standard to another is often 
costly and disruptive, and, thus, it is ex post both normal and efficient for an industry to be 
reluctant to make such a shift.”); Michel, supra note 14, at 891–92 (“Accused infringers will 
pay royalties based on the costs of switching to another technology, but switching costs may 
be prohibitively high due to the expense of retooling a manufacturing facility or ensuring 
interoperability with related products.”).  
23 Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Holding the Line on Patent 
Holdup: Why Antitrust Enforcement Matters Commissioner 1, 4 n.16 (Mar. 21, 2018) 
(transcript available at the Federal Trade Commission), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/1350033/mcsweeny_-_the_reality_of_patent_hold-up_3-21-
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM6E-3FNN].
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Patent holdup inflicts multiple harms across the economy. Patent 
holdup injures consumers who ultimately pay higher prices when 
exorbitant royalties are passed on to them.24 Economic efficiency 
suffers as output is reduced.25 In their 2013 Joint Policy Statement, the 
DOJ and PTO recognized that patent holdup can create inefficiency 
across markets because “it may induce prospective implementers to 
postpone or avoid making commitments to a standardized technology 
or to make inefficient investments in developing and implementing a 
standard in an effort to protect themselves.”26 The threat of patent 
holdup can delay implementation of an appropriate standard, which 
reduces the efficiency of the SSO and the overall economy.27 Patent 
holdup ultimately threatens the entire standard-setting process.28  
Standard-setting organizations have responded to the threat of 
patent holdup through a two-pronged approach. First, many SSOs 
require their members to disclose their IP rights during the standard-
setting process.29 In some cases, disclosure may allow an SSO to 
choose “an equally effective, non-proprietary standard” instead of a 
patented one.30 Second, many standard-setting organizations also 
24 Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (“In addition to harming firms that are 
forced to pay higher royalties, hold-up also harms consumers to the extent that those excess 
costs are passed onto them.”); Farrell et al., supra note 22, at 608, 644–47; Michel, supra 
note 14, at 889 (“Consumers will be harmed by higher prices if patentees are able to exercise 
monopoly power by obtaining licensing fees based on those investments rather than the 
economic value of the patented technology as determined by competition among 
alternatives.”). 
25 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 2011–17. 
26 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 4. 
27 Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (“Hold-up by one SEP holder also 
harms other firms that hold SEPs relating to the same standard because it jeopardizes further 
adoption of the standard and limits the ability of those other holders to obtain appropriate 
royalties on their technology.”); Adam Speegle, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse 
of the Standard-Setting Process, 110 MICH. L. REV. 847, 852 (2012) (citing Gil Ohana et 
al., Disclosure and Negotiation of Licensing Terms Prior to Adoption of Industry Standards: 
Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 644, 644–45 (2003); 
David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1913, 1914–17 (2003)). 
28 Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (“Hold-up can threaten the diffusion 
of valuable standards and undermine the standard-setting process.”). 
29 See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Broadcom 
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 309 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Each SDO Amicus has 
policies in place to require competing firms to disclose all relevant patents and licensing 
commitments.”); Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 937 (N.D. Cal. 
2012). 
30 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 624 n.2 (May 20, 1996). The failure to 
disclose one’s intellectual property can provide the basis for an antitrust violation. Id. at 618. 
2020] The DOJ’s Defense of Deception: 389 
 Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting the Standard-Setting Process
require that their members commit to charging a fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory31 royalty—or FRAND royalty—for any of their 
patents on technology that is incorporated into the standard.32 FRAND 
commitments are valuable because they facilitate the adoption of 
standards that are more likely to be the most efficient. The FRAND 
obligation is designed to “encourag[e] participation in standard-setting 
organizations but also . . . ensur[e] that SEPs are not overvalued.”33 
The obligation, however, must be binding, because if FRAND 
commitments are neither credible nor enforceable, SSOs may adopt 
suboptimal standards in an effort to minimize the risk of patent holdup. 
The FRAND apparatus can benefit all parties to the negotiation. 
Manufacturers and consumers benefit because they are protected 
against patent holdup. The patentholder benefits because absent the 
FRAND commitment, the SSO might decide to adopt a standard that 
does not read on that patentholder’s patent. Although the FRAND 
obligation reduces the royalties that the patentholder will receive, 
FRAND royalties are significantly better than no royalties. 
Patentholders want to own a standard-essential patent, even if that 
patent is subject to a FRAND commitment, because complying with 
the standard will drive manufacturers to practice the patentholders’ 
invention and, therefore, to pay royalties to the patentholder. 
If owners of standard-essential patents violate their FRAND 
obligations, however, they may be able to charge a monopoly price and 
engage in patent holdup. Part Two explores the antitrust implications 
of FRAND violations. 
31 Some courts and commentators refer to RAND and others to FRAND, but they share 
the same meaning. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 n.2 (9th Cir. 
2015) (“FRAND and RAND have the same meaning in the world of SEP licensing and in 
this opinion.”). This Article uses the FRAND terminology. 
32 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 313 (“To guard against anticompetitive patent hold-up, 
most SDOs require firms supplying essential technologies for inclusion in a prospective 
standard to commit to licensing their technologies on FRAND terms.”). 
33 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other 
grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see 
also In re Innovatio, No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013) (“[P]atent 
hold-up is a substantial problem that [F]RAND is designed to prevent.”). 
The actual determination of what constitutes a FRAND royalty can be complicated, but 
Judge Richard Posner has explained, “The proper method of computing a FRAND royalty 
starts with what the cost to the licensee would have been of obtaining, just before the 
patented invention was declared essential to compliance with the industry standard, a license 
for the function performed by the patent.” Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 
901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
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II 
FRAND VIOLATIONS AS AN ANTITRUST CONCERN 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns illegal monopolization.34 In 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., the Supreme Court held that  
[t]he offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.35
Monopoly power is the ability to control prices and exclude 
competition in the defined relevant market.36 After a standard has 
become entrenched, owners of standard-essential patents possess this 
power, almost by definition.37 
Section 2 does not condemn all monopolies, only those acquired 
or maintained through monopoly conduct, which is also sometimes 
called predatory conduct, exclusionary conduct, or anticompetitive 
conduct. Courts have not developed a single description of such 
conduct, but opinions often define “monopoly conduct” in contrast to 
“competition on the merits,” which is legal even when it results in a 
firm acquiring monopoly power. For example, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “‘exclusionary’ comprehends at the most behavior that not 
only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either 
does not further competition on the merits or does so in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way.”38 Lower courts have subsequently 
defined exclusionary conduct as “the creation or maintenance of 
monopoly by means other than the competition on the merits embodied 
34 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony . . . .”). 
35 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
36 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
37 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[S]tandards 
threaten to endow holders of standard-essential patents with disproportionate market 
power.”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (“[S]tandards essential patents are different from normal patents 
in that standards essential patents confer monopoly power on the patent owner because ‘[a] 
standard . . . by definition, eliminates alternative technologies,’ and enhances the value of 
the patent.” (citing Research in Motion, Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 793 
(N.D. Tex. 2008))). 
38 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985) 
(quoting 3 P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978)). 
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in the Grinnell standard.”39 Anticompetitive conduct is unlikely to 
qualify as competition on the merits if the monopolist lacks a 
procompetitive business reason for the challenged conduct.40 Thus, 
“[i]f the conduct has no rational business purpose other than its 
adverse effects on competitors, an inference that it is exclusionary is 
supported.”41
A. The Competitive Process of Standard Setting
To determine whether a defendant’s conduct is anticompetitive or 
competition on the merits, it is necessary to understand the nature of 
competition in the particular market at issue. By setting standards, 
SSOs perform a competitive function by helping members make 
objective comparisons among competing technologies.42 During this 
competition for the standard, monopoly power is not generally a 
problem, because, as former FTC Chair Deborah Platt Majoras has 
explained, “If, at the start of the process, any one of a number of 
competing formats could win the standards battle, then no single format 
will command more than a competitive price.”43 Before the adoption 
of the standard, patented (and unpatented) technologies compete 
against each other.44 
39 Stearns Airport Equip. Co., v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“Anticompetitive conduct may take a variety of forms, but it is generally defined as conduct 
to obtain or maintain monopoly power as a result of competition on some basis other than 
the merits.” (citing LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147 (2003))). 
40 Stearns Airport Equip. Co., 170 F.3d at 522 (“The key factor courts have analyzed in 
order to determine whether challenged conduct is or is not competition on the merits is the 
proffered business justification for the act.”); see also Taylor Publ’g. Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 
216 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stearns Airport Equip. Co., 170 F.3d at 522). 
41 Stearns Airport Equip. Co., 170 F.3d at 522 (citing Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608). 
42 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 309 (“Standards enhance competition in upstream 
markets, as well. One consequence of the standard-setting process is that SDOs may more 
readily make an objective comparison between competing technologies, patent positions, 
and licensing terms before an industry becomes locked in to a standard.”); Michel, supra 
note 14, at 891 (“SSOs establish extensive procedures for evaluating and choosing among 
alternative technologies to incorporate into the standard.”). 
43 Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Recognizing the 
Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting 2 (Sept. 23, 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA28-LV3R]. 
44 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“When a 
technology is incorporated into a standard, it is typically chosen from among different 
options.”). 
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Competition among patent owners in the standard-setting process 
takes place in the shadow of an SSO’s FRAND policy. The SSO 
members want to adopt the most efficient standard, and rational patent 
owners prefer a standard that reads on their patented technology. As 
part of this competitive process, the patentee bargains with the SSO by 
promising to forego monopoly power in exchange for the SSO adopting 
a standard that uses the patentee’s patented technology.45 The 
efficiency of the standard is a function of several factors, including 
scalability, interoperability, and cost.46 Patentholders make a FRAND 
commitment in order to compete against each other for inclusion in an 
SSO’s standard.47 Because cost is an important factor in choosing an 
industry standard, the presence or absence of a FRAND commitment 
is critical, because it is “a key indicator of the cost of implementing a 
potential technology.”48 If a patentholder refuses to commit to charging 
a reasonable royalty, “the SSO may bypass their technology and require 
that an alternative technology (either non-proprietary, or proprietary 
subject to a FRAND commitment) be chosen for the standard, or that 
no standard be adopted at all.”49 In short, FRAND commitments are an 
important part of the competitive process of standard setting. 
After the standard is adopted, competition for the standard is 
replaced by competition within the standard as manufacturers try 
to make the most cost-effective, standard-compliant products. 
Consumers benefit from this post-standard competition as rival 
manufacturers compete on the basis of price and quality.50 This street-
45 See Cary et al., supra note 1, at 918 (“And a ‘non-discriminatory’ royalty is one that 
prevents the patent holder from exploiting its monopoly position in downstream product 
markets that incorporate the standard (i.e., refusing to license the technology to firms that 
compete with the patent holder in products that incorporate its technology via the 
standard).”). 
46 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK JANIS, MARK LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER LESLIE & 
MICHAEL CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 35.02 (3d ed. 2017); Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai 
Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Golden Bridge Tech. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Potential procompetitive benefits of 
standards promoting technological compatibility include facilitating economies of scale in 
the market for complementary goods, reducing consumer search costs, and increasing 
economic efficiency.”). 
47 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 313 (“A firm’s FRAND commitment, therefore, is a 
factor—and an important factor—that the SDO will consider in evaluating the suitability of 
a given proprietary technology vis-a-vis competing technologies.”). 
48 Id. 
49 Cary et al., supra note 1, at 916. 
50 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 309 (“The adoption of a standard does not eliminate 
competition among producers but, rather, moves the focus away from the development of 
potential standards and toward the development of means for implementing the chosen 
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level competition is all made possible and more efficient by the SSO 
standard-setting activities that preceded it because, as the Ninth Circuit 
has explained, “Standardization provides enormous value to both 
consumers and manufacturers. It increases competition by lowering 
barriers to entry and adds value to manufacturers’ products by 
encouraging production by other manufacturers of devices compatible 
with them.”51  
Despite all the benefits of standardization, the standard-setting 
process does entail some antitrust risks. Standards can create monopoly 
power for patentholders. Patents generally do not by themselves confer 
monopoly power on their owners.52 But standard-essential patents are 
different—they do bestow significant market power if the standard is 
widely adopted.53 During the competition for the standard, different 
technologies can price discipline each other, but once the standard is 
adopted and implemented, alternative technologies can no longer serve 
this function.54 Courts recognize that “[b]y incorporating patented 
technology into a standard, the patent-holder obtains market power 
because adoption of the standard eliminates alternatives to the patented 
standard.”); BRUCE D. ABRAMSON, THE SECRET CIRCUIT: THE LITTLE-KNOWN COURT 
WHERE THE RULES OF THE INFORMATION AGE UNFOLD 329 (2007) (“Competition ‘within 
the standard’ replaces competition ‘for the standard,’ and consumers win.”); see also 
Michel, supra note 14, at 891 (“In addition, competition among the standardized products 
of different manufacturers increases choice and decreases prices for consumers.”). 
51 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). 
52 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006); see HOVENKAMP, 
JANIS, LEMLEY, LESLIE & CARRIER, supra note 46, § 4. 
53 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (“Moreover, a number of courts have recognized a legal 
distinction between a normal patent—to which antitrust market power is generally not 
conferred on the patent owner, and a patent incorporated into a standard—to which antitrust 
market power may be conferred on the patent owner.”); Research in Motion, Ltd. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 793 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
54 Farrell et al., supra note 22, at 607 (“Ex ante, before an industry standard is chosen, 
there are various attractive technologies, but ex post, after industry participants choose a 
standard and take steps to implement it, alternative technologies become less attractive. 
Thus, a patent covering a standard may confer market power ex post that was much weaker 
ex ante.”). 
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technology.”55 Thus, the standard confers value on the patent.56 In 
short, absent a FRAND commitment, standardization often results in 
patentholders acquiring monopoly power.57 
Acquisition of monopoly power via standard setting may seem 
anticompetitive. Standards are necessarily exclusionary because any 
technology that is noncompliant with the standard is effectively 
excluded from the market because manufacturers need their phones, 
music players, and other devices to be standard-compliant in order to 
ensure interoperability and meet consumer demand.58 This exclusion, 
however, does not itself violate antitrust laws.59 Although patentees 
bargain during the standard-setting process to exclude competitors, this 
bargaining is part of the competitive process.60  
55 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (“When a 
patented technology is incorporated in a standard, adoption of the standard eliminates 
alternatives to the patented technology.”); Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 
297 F. Supp. 3d 222, 230 (D. Mass. 2018), motion to certify appeal denied, 313 F. Supp. 3d 
366 (D. Mass. 2018); Michel, supra note 14, at 889 (“Although multiple alternative 
technologies may have competed to be chosen during the standard-setting process, once the 
standard is set, those alternatives will no longer offer viable options because of industry-
wide investments made to implement the standard.”). 
56 Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 2118 (“Further, enforcing sound, rigorously-
defined FRAND commitments would enable SEP holders to recover the ex ante value of 
their technology—that is, the value of the patented technology before implementers were 
locked in. Ex ante value reflects what the SEP holder would have been paid by implementers 
of the standard in an ex ante bargain, and is the proper measure of the market value of the 
SEPs.”). 
Delrahim concedes this. Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 6 (“Moreover, as a result 
of having its technology incorporated into a standard, a patent holder may gain incremental 
market power beyond any power that holding a patent would already convey.”). 
57 Cary et al., supra note 1, at 915 (“Before a standard is adopted, a patent holder seeking 
to have its technology included in the standard can only charge licensees a price that reflects 
the incremental value of its technology over the next-best alternative technology.” (citing 
Farrell et al., supra note 22, at 611–15)). 
58 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 6 (“In the context of legitimate standard setting, 
the collective decision to incorporate a patented technology into a standard necessarily 
involves the ‘exclusion’ of rival technologies.”); see Cary et al., supra note 1, at 914 
(“Selecting a standard ordinarily requires an SSO to choose among competing technologies, 
and the process frequently results in a collective selection of a patented technology to the 
exclusion of other patented or non-proprietary technologies.”). 
59 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 6 (“Simply winning selection by a standard 
setting process does not constitute unlawful exclusionary conduct under the antitrust laws.”). 
60 Delrahim correctly notes that not all exclusionary conduct violates Section 2 because 
some conduct that excludes rivals is better characterized as competition on the merits, which 
antitrust law encourages. Id. at 4 (“Most obviously, legitimate competition on the merits can 
be ‘exclusionary’ in the sense that consumers choose a superior product or service.”). 
Securing monopoly power through innovation, for example, does not violate antitrust laws. 
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That, however, does not mean that the acquisition of monopoly 
power through standardization is inherently legal. There are things that 
a participant in the standard-setting process could do that would violate 
antitrust laws,61 as the following section explains. 
B. Deception and Breach as Monopoly Conduct
A patentholder engages in deception when it makes a FRAND 
commitment during the standard-setting process with the intent of 
charging non-FRAND royalties after the standard incorporating its SEP 
has become entrenched.62 This is important for antitrust jurisprudence 
because deception is a hallmark of some noncompetitive markets.63 
Courts have found that lying and deception can constitute monopoly 
conduct. For example, the Supreme Court in Walker Process 
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. held that a firm 
violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act when it procures a patent through 
fraud and seeks to enforce it against its rivals.64 A Walker Process 
claim is essentially a deception-based antitrust cause of action. The 
antitrust plaintiff must prove that the patent monopolist made a 
misrepresentation to the Patent Office with “the intent to deceive” or 
its equivalent.65 
In addition to the government officials deceived in Walker Process 
cases, courts also condemn deception against private actors as illegal 
monopoly conduct. In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,66 the D.C. 
Circuit sitting en banc found that Microsoft had violated Section 2 of 
61 See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) 
(improperly packing SSO voting panel to exclude competitor can violate Sherman Act). 
62 It is also deceptive for an SSO member to assert that it possesses no relevant patents—
and has no relevant patent applications pending—when it knows that it does. This Article 
does not discuss this form of patent deception because it is not the focus of Delrahim’s 
public speeches. 
63 See Maurice E. Stucke, When a Monopolist Deceives, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 823, 824 
(2010) (“Deception does not occur in a perfectly competitive market, which has transparent 
prices, highly elastic demand curves, easy entry and exit, and perfectly informed, profit-
maximizing buyers and sellers, who are so numerous that each can act as a price-taker.”). 
64 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965); see Cary et al., supra note 1, at 938 (“Walker Process itself 
demonstrates that a party’s acquisition of monopoly power through deception is and always 
has been a core antitrust concern under Section 2 . . . .”). 
65 Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011). See 
generally Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to Deceive 
the Patent Office, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 323 (2011) (discussing the relationship between 
patent deception and antitrust law). 
66 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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the Sherman Act when the company sought to defend its monopoly 
over Intel-compatible PC operating systems by thwarting the evolution 
of Java, a technology that could undermine Microsoft’s monopoly by 
allowing developers to write their applications once and have them run 
on any operating system. In violation of its license with Java’s owner 
and licensor, Sun Microsystems, Microsoft created its own version of 
Java—which it internally referred to as “polluted Java”—that could run 
only on Microsoft’s operating system.67 Microsoft then lied to 
application developers and told them that any applications that they 
wrote on Microsoft’s version of Java would run on any operating 
system.68 Because developers believed Microsoft’s lie, they wrote 
applications on Microsoft’s version of polluted Java that (unbeknownst 
to them) reinforced Microsoft’s monopoly over operating systems. The 
D.C. Circuit concluded that Microsoft’s deception of the application
developers “served to protect [Microsoft’s] monopoly of the operating
system in a manner not attributable either to the superiority of the
operating system or to the acumen of its makers, and therefore was
anticompetitive.”69 In short, deception constituted monopoly conduct.
The reasoning of deception-based antitrust cases extends to 
dishonesty directed against standard-setting organizations. In scenarios 
not involving FRAND commitments, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that abuse of the SSO process can create antitrust liability 
when parties engage in “deceptive practices.”70 Manipulating the 
standard-setting process is anticompetitive and can violate Section 2. 
Deception undermines the competitive process of standard formulation 
because the negotiation for the most appropriate standard “is 
undermined if buyers are deceived or manipulated into a deal that they 
did not knowingly choose.”71 Thus, federal courts have recognized that 
“[i]ntentional misrepresentations designed to deceive a standard-
setting organization can constitute an antitrust violation.”72  
Such reasoning should extend to deception regarding FRAND 
commitments for several reasons. First, this deception distorts 
67 Id. at 76–77. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 77. 
70 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988). 
71 Farrell et al., supra note 22, at 609 (“This is not merely a private contracting problem, 
but an antitrust problem. It concerns the inefficient acquisition of market power that harms 
consumers; more fundamentally, deceiving buyers or keeping them in the dark about the 
terms on which a technology will be available subverts the competitive process.”). 
72 Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 222, 230 (D. Mass. 
2018), motion to certify appeal denied, 313 F. Supp. 3d 366 (D. Mass. 2018). 
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competition for the standard. The Third Circuit has explained that 
“[d]eception in a consensus-driven private standard-setting 
environment harms the competitive process by obscuring the costs of 
including proprietary technology in a standard and increasing the 
likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent 
holder.”73 By misrepresenting relevant cost information, FRAND 
deceitfulness may lead to the improper exclusion of technologies that 
would have benefitted consumers in the long run.74 The patentholder’s 
deception creates an unfair advantage over rivals who told the truth.75 
This rewarding of dishonesty can threaten the long-term survival of 
SSOs.76  
Second, when a firm intentionally misrepresents a commitment to 
charge a FRAND royalty that is relied upon by an SSO in adopting 
a standard that reads on the firm’s patent, it commits fraud as that 
concept exists in Walker Process jurisprudence.77 Some scholars have 
argued that deception during the private standard-setting process is 
even more dangerous because “standard setting inherently involves 
competitors in an industry choosing ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ not through 
traditional competition on the merits, but rather through negotiation 
and agreement, which are also core concerns of the antitrust laws.”78 
73 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
74 Note, Deception as an Antitrust Violation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2012) 
(“While deception of consumers causes anticompetitive harm by distorting consumer 
choice, other forms of deception cause anticompetitive harm by distorting the competitive 
process. For example, deception of a standard-setting organization can lead the organization 
to set standards unfavorable to rival products, which tends to exclude rivals or raise rivals’ 
costs, thereby reducing output and raising prices.”); see also Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, 
Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 
1, 51–55 (1997). 
75 Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 313 (“Misrepresentations concerning the cost of 
implementing a given technology may confer an unfair advantage and bias the competitive 
process in favor of that technology’s inclusion in the standard.”). 
76 See infra notes 149–61 and accompanying text. 
77 In Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the 
Federal Circuit noted that Walker Process fraud is a form of “common law fraud,” whose 
elements are 
(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that representation, (3) the
intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so reckless as to the consequences that
it is held to the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation by the party deceived which induces him to act thereon, and
(5) injury to the party deceived as a result of his reliance on the misrepresentation.
Id. at 1359. Thus, if a firm intended to not honor its FRAND obligations when it made them, 
the conduct satisfies the definition of fraud used in Walker Process jurisprudence. 
78 Cary et al., supra note 1, at 938–39. 
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Taking a slightly different tack than those scholars, this Article argues 
that the negotiation over the standard is, in fact, a form of competition 
on the merits. But, in any case, there may be circumstances in which 
deception against an SSO is arguably more anticompetitive than 
deception against the PTO. Walker Process claims involve fraudulently 
procured patents that can be invalidated, which can generally permit 
restoration of a competitive market. In contrast, FRAND deception 
occurs with valid patents whose owners have manipulated the standard-
setting process. The market for standard-compliant products cannot 
return to its pre-deception state, because once the standard has been 
adopted and implemented it is entrenched, and the cost of switching 
creates a lock-in effect. FRAND deception is, thus, relatively difficult 
to remedy. 
Third, deception can create Section 2 liability, in part, because 
deception cannot be supported by any procompetitive justifications.79 
In finding Microsoft liable for illegal monopolization, the D.C. Circuit 
noted that “Microsoft offers no procompetitive explanation for its 
campaign to deceive developers. Accordingly, we conclude this 
conduct is exclusionary, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.”80 Lies 
regarding FRAND obligations similarly lack such a justification. 
Owners of SEPs cannot reasonably assert that their FRAND fraud 
improved the efficiency of the standard-setting process or somehow 
increased consumer welfare. Like most anticompetitive conduct, 
FRAND deception is motivated by the desire to maximize profits 
beyond competitive returns at the expense of consumers. 
Given the above analysis, it is not surprising that federal courts 
have held that a patentholder’s FRAND deception before an SSO 
constitutes anticompetitive conduct as that term is used in antitrust 
79 Note, supra note 74, at 1236 (“Deception can cause a myriad of anticompetitive harms 
to both economic efficiency and consumer welfare, with no countervailing procompetitive 
justifications.”); Richard Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1479, 1496 n.90 (2010) (“[I]t cannot be said that ‘economics literature 
is replete with procompetitive justifications’ for deception.” (quoting Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007)); Maurice E. Stucke, How Do 
(and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm’s Deception?, 63 SMU L. 
REV. 1069, 1074 (2010) (“Deception lacks any redeeming economic qualities or cognizable 
efficiency justifications.”).  
80 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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jurisprudence.81 Most notably, the Third Circuit in Broadcom Corp. v. 
Qualcomm Inc.82 famously held 
(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment,
(2) a patent holder’s intentionally false promise to license essential
proprietary technology on FRAND terms, (3) coupled with an
[SSO’s] reliance on that promise when including the technology in a
standard, and (4) the patent holder’s subsequent breach of that
promise, is actionable anticompetitive conduct.83
Among courts and commentators, a clear consensus exists that 
acquiring or maintaining monopoly power through deception regarding 
FRAND commitments satisfies the monopoly conduct element of 
illegal monopolization.84 
Beyond deception, the violation of a FRAND commitment amounts 
to monopoly conduct because it is not competition on the merits. 
The FRAND commitment is essentially a legally binding contract.85 
Disregarding a FRAND commitment, therefore, constitutes a breach of 
contract.86 Courts, for example, have noted that FRAND violations 
breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing that are read into every 
contract.87 Acquiring monopoly power through breach of contract is 
not competition on the merits.88 Courts have even held that inducing 
others to breach contracts is anticompetitive conduct.89 In sum, even 
81 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he FTC 
has found deception of an SDO to constitute anticompetitive conduct in violation of § 2 of 
the Sherman Act.”). 
82 Id. at 323. 
83 Id. at 314. 
84 Id. at 308; Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1097 
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Stucke, supra note 79, at 1103–04 (“If defendant attains or maintains its 
monopoly by deceiving the private standard-setting organization (or otherwise manipulating 
its process), this raises antitrust concerns.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent 
Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1194 (2009) (“If the patentee uses 
deceptive conduct to acquire monopoly power that otherwise would not exist, either in its 
own hands or someone else’s, the standard for liability would appear to be met.”); Susan A. 
Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 986 (2005).  
85 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 
2012); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (“Moreover, both parties agree that Samsung’s contractual 
obligation arising from its FRAND declarations to ETSI at the very least created a duty to 
negotiate in good faith with Apple regarding FRAND terms.”). 
86 Delrahim concedes this. See infra note 185. 
87 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015). 
88 Christopher R. Leslie, Monopolization Through Patent Theft, 103 GEO. L.J. 47, 86 
(2014). 
89 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 874 (D. Md. 1916). 
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without deception at the outset, violating FRAND commitments can 
constitute monopoly conduct.90 
A FRAND violation retroactively distorts the competitive process 
because the competitive process for picking the standard is tainted after 
the patentee has breached its FRAND commitment.91 It is too late for 
a new competitive process to select a different standard because of 
switching costs.92 This is very different from the situation in which, for 
example, a year-long contract is granted every year and a particular 
firm gets the contract through misrepresentations; that situation can be 
remedied moving forward at the next opportunity for contract 
renewal.93 Breach of a FRAND obligation—whether or not preceded 
by affirmative deception during the standard-setting process—has 
long-lived anticompetitive consequences.  
III 
THE DOJ’S NEW POLICY ALLOWING MONOPOLIZATION THROUGH 
PATENTHOLDER DECEPTION 
Through his series of speeches, Trump’s Assistant Attorney General 
for the Antitrust Division has been trying to make the case that a 
patentholder’s use of deception to manipulate standard-setting 
decisionmakers and to acquire market power is perfectly acceptable 
from an antitrust point of view. In his New Madison speech at the 
90 Cary et al., supra note 1, at 943 (noting the argument “that avoiding the FRAND 
constraint is the conduct giving rise to monopoly power, and should be actionable 
monopolization.”). 
91 See Michel, supra note 14, at 892 (“The ability of patentees to demand the ‘holdup’ 
value based on sunk costs could raise prices for consumers beyond the competitive level, 
while undermining efficient choices made among technologies competing for inclusion in a 
standard.”). 
It may seem odd to claim that ex post conduct can taint the ex ante process. It does so in 
this case because the legitimacy of the entire standard-setting apparatus is premised on the 
belief that patentees must honor their promises to charge a FRAND royalty. Even in the 
absence of ex ante deception—of the type that Delrahim has essentially defended in his 
public speeches—ex post FRAND violations expose a troubling flaw that could undermine 
all standard-setting processes. The competitive process that incorporates a FRAND 
requirements allows SSO members to compare apples to apples, e.g., Technology A with a 
FRAND royalty versus Technology B with a FRAND royalty. If there is no meaningful 
enforcement of those FRAND representations ex post, then the ex ante competitive process 
was flawed because it did not provide for a proper apples-to-apples evaluation. 
92 Id. at 891–92 (“Indeed, it is often difficult, or even impossible, to modify a standard 
due to the need for newly manufactured products to be backward-compatible and 
interoperable with similar products already owned by consumers, resulting in industry ‘lock 
in.’”). 
93 Nat’l Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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University of Pennsylvania Law School, Delrahim opined that “hold-
up is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and therefore antitrust 
law should not be used as a tool to police FRAND commitments that 
patent-holders make to standard setting organizations.”94 At his Long 
Run speech in Washington D.C. the following month, Delrahim 
asserted that “[u]sing the antitrust laws to impugn a patent holder’s 
efforts to enforce valid IP rights risks undermining the dynamic 
competition we are charged with fostering.”95 During his New Wild 
West speech in Fall 2018, Delrahim reiterated that “[a] unilateral 
violation of a FRAND commitment should not give rise to a cause of 
action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if a patent holder is 
alleged to have misled or deceived a standard-setting organization with 
respect to its licensing intentions.”96 Delrahim explicitly stated that 
there is no Section 2 issue even when a patentholder monopolist has 
“deceived the standard setting body by making a commitment to license 
on FRAND terms when it purportedly never had any intention of 
granting such a license.”97 This Part presents Delrahim’s reasoning 
across his five speeches and exposes the holes in his arguments. 
A. Delrahim’s Rights of Patentholders
In most of his speeches, Delrahim begins by noting the constitutional 
basis for intellectual property rights, including the fact that before the 
Bill of Rights was ratified, the Constitution’s only use of the word 
“rights” resided in Article I, Section 8, which authorized (but did not 
require) Congress to create patent and copyright rights.98 At times, he 
seems to speak as though IP rights are the only rights that matter.99 
Among the patent rights that Delrahim touts are the right to injunctions, 
the right to refuse licenses, and the right to raise prices. Although he 
invokes each of these rights to defend misconduct by FRAND 
violators, the following sections explain why he is wrong. 
94 Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 3, at 5. 
95 Delrahim, The Long Run, supra note 3, at 3. 
96 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 5. 
97 Id. at 3. 
98 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
99 Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 3, at 3 (“Remarkably, the word ‘right’ appears 
only once in the original Constitution—which took effect two years before the Bill of Rights 
was ratified—in the Copyright and Patent Clause.”). 
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1. The Right to Injunctive Relief
Delrahim champions great deference to a patentholder’s so-called
right to injunctions. For example, he has repeatedly “criticized the 
argument that it ought to be a violation of antitrust law for a holder of 
a standard-essential patent, or SEP, to exclude competitors from using 
the technology, including by seeking an injunction against the sale of 
infringing goods.”100 Delrahim has promised that his Antitrust 
Division is “committed to ensuring that patent holders maintain their 
full constitutional right to seek an injunction against infringement”101 
even when an SEP owner is flouting its FRAND commitments.102 
Delrahim does not mention that under patent law the right to injunctive 
relief is not absolute.103 
Trump’s AAG argues that royalty rates between the owners of SEPs 
and the manufacturers of standard-dependent products should be 
“resolved through the free market, typically in the form of freely 
negotiated licensing agreements for royalties or reciprocal licenses.”104 
Further, he argues that the patent owner should be able to enjoin 
production by any manufacturers with whom it does not reach an 
agreement.105 
Delrahim’s argument betrays a fundamental lack of understanding 
of how free markets work. Although Delrahim often invokes the 
concept of “free-market competition,”106 he fails to recognize that 
patents are the antithesis of free market competition. In a truly free 
market, rivals would be able to copy each other’s innovations and 
compete for customers’ business. Patent law represents an exemption 
from free-market competition because the constitutional drafters 
recognized (and current policymakers continue to appreciate) that 
without being able to stifle short-term competition, innovators may not 
have sufficient incentive to innovate, because their inventions could be 
copied by competitors who could sell for a cheaper price because they 
100 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 4. 
101 Id. at 14. 
102 See id. 
103 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to 
well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy 
a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. . . . The decision to grant or deny 
permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
104 Delrahim, Take It to the Limit, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
105 Id. at 11–13; see also Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 3, at 12–15; Delrahim, 
Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 3–5. 
106 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 3. 
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do not have to recoup investments in research and development.107 
Without giving innovators some protection against immediate 
competition, innovations could dry up.108 It is right to restrain the free 
market in a limited fashion in order to grant IP rights, but it is wrong to 
suggest that patent licensing occurs in a truly free market. 
There is no such thing as a free market in the context of standard-
essential patents. After the standard has been adopted, the patentee has 
all the bargaining power, because the manufacturers are already locked 
into the standard. In a free market, both parties to the proposed 
transaction have the ability to walk away from the negotiation. But the 
standard-implementers cannot simply walk away because—having 
manufactured standard-compliant products—the SEP holder is suing 
for patent infringement. The SEP holder is not engaging in a market 
transaction when it violates its FRAND commitment; rather, it is 
offering to settle a legal dispute on nonmarket terms.109 In Delrahim’s 
world, the SEP owner should be able to shut down any manufacturer 
that does not acquiesce and submit to the patentholder’s demands, even 
though the manufacturer can neither turn to another patentholder for a 
license nor design around the patent, because standard-conforming 
products cannot be made without reading on the SEP.110 The patent 
owner can issue an ultimatum to every manufacturer: pay a monopoly 
royalty or exit the market. This is the very definition of patent 
holdup.111 The looming threat of injunction allows the SEP owner to 
demand a non-FRAND royalty based on the value of the entire standard 
instead of the (much lower) pre-standard value of the patent.112 That 
threat of injunction prevents a truly free licensing negotiation.113 
107 CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
4–5 (2011). 
108 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 132 
(2006) (discussing the inconsistencies between the teaching function and reward theory of 
patents). 
109 See William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent 
Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385 (2016). 
110 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at 
*10–11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“[E]xplaining that the ‘essence of hold-up’ is that
while ex ante competition constrains what a patent holder can obtain for access to its patent,
ex post, the technology in the standard does not face that competition.”) (paraphrasing
economist Schmalensee testimony).
111 See supra text accompanying notes 16–26 (discussing harms of patent holdup). 
112 Michel, supra note 14, at 897. 
113 Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 
2013) (explaining that seeking an injunction “is a clear attempt to gain leverage in future 
licensing negotiations”); Michel, supra note 14, at 889–90 (“Remedies for patent 
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In the case of an SEP, in order to temper that patentee’s 
overwhelming power arising from its patented technology being 
incorporated into the standard, the manufacturer should be able to make 
a standard-compliant product and have a court later calculate the 
reasonable level of royalties that the manufacturer owes the SEP owner 
if the patentee refuses to grant a license on FRAND terms. This would 
allow the product market to function efficiently while the parties 
determine the appropriate royalty rate. Consumers benefit because 
competition among the manufacturers for retail sales—competition 
within the standard—continues unabated. The patentholder, even 
though it cannot enjoin the use of the SEP in the manufacture of 
standard-compliant products, will receive a reasonable royalty on every 
unit of product that reads on the patent. This approach is fair because 
the patentholder agreed to charge a FRAND royalty in exchange for 
having the SSO consider including its patented technology in the 
standard. This may be less than the monopoly royalty, but a reasonable 
royalty is precisely what the patentholder agreed to when making the 
FRAND commitment. After all, the “R” stands for “reasonable.” 
Delrahim, however, disparages this approach because it deprives 
the SEP owner of the power to shut down the manufacturer’s factories. 
The DOJ/PTO Joint Policy Statement warned against injunctions or 
exclusion orders that “may harm competition and consumers by 
degrading one of the tools [SSOs] employ to mitigate the threat of such 
opportunistic actions by the holders of F/RAND-encumbered patents 
that are essential to their standards.”114 This, however, is the Policy 
Statement that Delrahim unilaterally rescinded in his Telegraph Road 
speech at Stanford Law School.115 
The AAG is wrong to suggest that allowing antitrust claims based 
on monopolization through FRAND deception would infringe the 
legitimate right of patentholders to seek injunctions where appropriate. 
For example, injunctions may be appropriate when would-be licensees 
refuse to pay a FRAND royalty or when manufacturers practice the 
patent without a license in a product that is not complying with a 
standard.116 But patent owners who have agreed to FRAND royalties 
infringement are particularly important because they set the framework for licensing 
negotiations and provide the source of the patentee’s power to extract monopoly rents from 
standardized products.”).  
114 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 6. 
115 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
116 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 7 (“An exclusion order may still be an 
appropriate remedy in some circumstances, such as where the putative licensee is unable or 
refuses to take a F/RAND license.”); Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 2124 (“Instead, 
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sometimes initiate legal actions before even offering licensees a 
license.117 That is a clear violation of the FRAND commitment. 
Delrahim repeatedly ignores that the patentholder has made a 
FRAND commitment. For example, he has emphasized the need “to 
protect the patent holder’s right to seek an injunction against infringing 
uses of its technology, even when the patent is essential to the practice 
of a technological standard.”118 But he never really wrestles with the 
fact that the only reason the patent is essential to the practice of 
a technological standard may be because the patentholder herself 
promised to forego, or limit, her right to injunctive relief.119 The 
patentholder has a general right to ask a court for an injunction, but this 
is a right that can be bargained away;120 a patentee who makes a 
FRAND commitment in exchange for possible inclusion in a standard 
has struck this bargain and should be held to it.  
2. The Right to Refuse to License
In general, patent owners possess the right to decline to license their
IP rights. Delrahim has embraced this uncontroversial point in his effort 
to create a more sweeping right that exempts unilateral refusals to 
license from antitrust liability altogether. In his first speech on FRAND 
violations, Delrahim proclaimed that “a unilateral refusal to license a 
valid patent should be per se legal” under antitrust laws.121 His 
argument and reasoning are flawed. 
the proper approach would be to make injunction remedies available only if the implementer 
refuses to pay the FRAND rate after that rate has been determined.”). 
117 See, e.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 (“Defendants’ 
conduct in this case (bringing the ITC action before offering a license) is even more glaringly 
inconsistent with its RAND obligations than Motorola’s request for an injunction at the 
district court after offering a license to Microsoft in the Motorola case.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
118 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 2. 
119 Cf. Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 
1039–43 (2010) (arguing that injunctions should not apply in the RAND context); see 
Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and 
the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 358 (2007) (arguing that the FRAND 
commitment creates an “irrevocable waiver of injunctive relief” that helps prevent patent 
holdup). 
120 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (A FRAND 
commitment includes “at least arguably, a guarantee that the patent-holder will not take 
steps to keep would-be users from using the patented material, such as seeking an 
injunction.”).  
121 Delrahim, Take It to the Limit, supra note 3, at 8 (“The enforcement of valid patent 
rights should not be a violation of antitrust law. A patent holder cannot violate the antitrust 
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Although antitrust law recognizes every firm’s—not just IP 
owners’—general right to refuse to deal,122 antitrust law also restricts 
this right in the face of monopoly conduct.123 Although Delrahim 
begins his speeches by emphasizing the rights of patentholders, he 
seems to forget the Supreme Court’s warning in Lorain Journal, where 
the Court found an antitrust violation and noted that “the word ‘right’ 
is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a 
qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the 
conclusion. Most rights are qualified.”124 That includes the right to 
refuse to do business. Even in the absence of enforceable contracts, 
terminating an existing business relationship may constitute 
exclusionary conduct under antitrust law, as the Supreme Court held in 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.125 In Aspen Skiing, 
the Court upheld a jury verdict of illegal monopolization against a 
ski company that terminated a profitable and desirable—but 
noncontractual—business arrangement in order to drive its one rival 
from the market.126 
Conduct characterized as a unilateral refusal to license can violate 
antitrust laws in many ways entirely outside the context of standards. 
For example, patent tying—in which the patentholder refuses to license 
its patent unless the licensee also purchases or licenses a separate 
product—can violate the Sherman Act.127 Some may say that tying 
represents a conditional refusal to deal, instead of a simple refusal.128 
But courts have found unconditional refusals to deal in intellectual 
laws by properly exercising the rights patents confer, such as seeking an injunction or 
refusing to license such a patent. Set aside whether taking these actions might violate the 
common law. Under the antitrust laws, I humbly submit that a unilateral refusal to license a 
valid patent should be per se legal.”). 
122 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
123 Id. (“In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does 
not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private 
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will 
deal.”) (emphasis added). 
124 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951) (quoting Am. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Fed. Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921)). 
125 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
126 Id. at 610–11. 
127 See Christopher R. Leslie, Patent Tying, Price Discrimination, and Innovation, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 811, 815 (2011). 
128 In one of his speeches, Delrahim makes this distinction. Delrahim, New Madison, 
supra note 3, at 5 (“[C]onsistent with the fundamental right to exclude, from the perspective 
of the antitrust laws, a unilateral and unconditional refusal to license a patent should be 
considered per se legal.”). 
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property to violate antitrust law.129 In short, a so-called unilateral 
refusal to license is not—and never has been—per se legal.130 
In any case, FRAND violations do not involve a simple refusal to 
license because the SEP owner has already contractually obligated 
itself to license its patents to all manufacturers in a nondiscriminatory 
fashion and on reasonable terms. An SEP owner cannot legally refuse 
to license its patent as part of the standard because it has agreed to 
license its SEP to all comers as part of its bargain with the SSO.131 
The Ninth Circuit has explained that, under the FRAND agreements 
used by SSOs, “an SEP holder cannot refuse a license to a manufacturer 
who commits to paying the [F]RAND rate.”132 Importantly, the 
patentholder’s right to refuse licenses is not inalienable. Thus, even 
though some antitrust opinions may seem to imply a right to 
unilaterally refuse to license,133 these cases are distinguishable because 
they did not involve a patentholder who has promised to grant FRAND 
licenses in exchange for being included in a standard. 
Many of Delrahim’s arguments are founded on a misreading of case 
law. For example, Delrahim relies a great deal on the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP.134 He asserts that the Trinko Court rejected the plaintiff’s 
claim that Verizon had run afoul of Section 2 by refusing to provide 
adequate connections for its rivals, in violation of FCC regulations, 
“because the claim would condemn a monopolist’s refusal to share its 
resources and effectively would create an antitrust duty to help a 
competitor.”135 Delrahim, however, mischaracterizes Trinko when he 
claims that the majority “applied a legal rule, rather than a fact-specific 
129 See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
130 See Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual and Other 
Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 369, 369–70 (2009). 
131 See Layne S. Keele, Holding Standards for RANDsome: A Remedial Perspective on 
RAND Licensing Commitments, 64 KAN. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2015) (“The Joint Electron 
Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) requires its participants to agree to ‘offer to license 
on RAND terms to all Potential Licensees’ any patent having standard-essential claims.”) 
(citing JEDEC SOLID STATE TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, JEDEC POLICIES MANUAL, 
JM21R §§ 8.2.4, 8.2.1 (July 2015)). 
132 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). 
133 See, e.g., Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1324 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
134 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
135 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 4. 
408 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 379 
rule.”136 The Trinko opinion is completely fact-specific, turning on 
Justice Scalia’s assertion that an antitrust remedy was unnecessary 
because the federal government had already created a regulatory 
scheme to address the precise misconduct at issue in the case.137 
Separately, Delrahim claimed that Trinko held that “a business has 
no antitrust duty to deal with another company, and only in limited 
circumstances will a refusal to deal give rise to a potential antitrust 
claim.”138 His statement is inherently self-contradictory. He starts off 
with the sweeping claim that there is “no antitrust duty to deal” and 
then admits that a “refusal to deal” can create antitrust liability. If the 
refusal to deal violates antitrust law in any particular instance, then 
there is an “antitrust duty to deal” in that case. The issue, then, is 
whether acquiring one’s monopoly power by promising to charge a 
FRAND royalty—in order to get one’s patented technology included 
into a standard—creates such a duty. The answer is yes because 
otherwise patentees can acquire monopoly power through deception, 
which is not competition on the merits.139  
Moreover, with his focus on Trinko and other pro-defendant 
opinions, Delrahim does not reconcile his position with the larger body 
of antitrust jurisprudence in which courts, including the Supreme Court 
on many occasions, have imposed a duty to deal.140 And while the 
Trinko Court asserted that Aspen Skiing represented the “outer 
boundary” of Section 2 liability, FRAND violations by an SEP owner 
fall well within the parameters of Aspen Skiing and, indeed, present a 
stronger case for antitrust liability. Unlike the successful antitrust 
plaintiffs in Aspen Skiing, plaintiffs bringing monopolization claims 
based on FRAND deception can point to an actual enforceable promise 
that the defendant has breached. 
Ultimately, Delrahim is adamant that antitrust law should not 
impose any duty to deal on patentholders.141 But what he consistently 
136 Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
137 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (“One factor of particular importance is the existence of a 
regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm.”). 
138 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 9. 
139 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
140 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 
(1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973); Lorain Journal Co. 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S.
383, 516 (1912).
141 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Don’t Stop 
Thinking About Tomorrow”: Promoting Innovation by Ensuring Market-Based Application 
of Antitrust to Intellectual Property (June 6, 2019) [hereinafter Delrahim, Thinking About 
Tomorrow] (“An antitrust cause of action premised on a failure to abide by FRAND 
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fails to recognize is that no one is imposing a duty on patentholders. 
They have voluntarily undertaken a duty to issue licenses on reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory terms as part of their participation in the 
standard-setting process.142 This is not an instance of judges creating 
and imposing duties on innocent monopolists.143 
In short, attaching antitrust liability for monopolization through 
FRAND deception does not infringe upon a patentholder’s right to 
refuse to license its intellectual property because the patentholder has 
already bargained away that right. So, even if Delrahim and his 
followers were correct on the law, FRAND violations do not involve a 
simple unilateral refusal to license. It is simply absurd to say that 
acquiring monopoly power through acts of deception and breach of 
contract should be per se legal, as a matter of antitrust law.  
3. The Right to Raise Price
The conceptual counterpart to the so-called unilateral refusal to
license is the SEP owner demanding a monopoly royalty from 
manufacturers making standard-compliant products. The threat to 
refuse to license an SEP is generally part of a larger strategy to extort 
non-FRAND payments. Delrahim, and other commentators who 
defend patent holdup, argue that such demands for non-FRAND 
royalties cannot violate antitrust laws because the Sherman Act does 
not prohibit a lawful monopolist from charging a monopoly price.144 
Delrahim, for example, argues that “[t]here is no duty under the 
antitrust laws for a patent holder to license on FRAND terms, even after 
having committed to do so.”145 He concedes that “a FRAND 
commitments would be inconsistent with Section 2 of the Sherman Act. That is because 
there is no duty under U.S. antitrust law for a holder of an intellectual property right to 
license on FRAND terms, even after having committed to do so.”), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-organisation-
economic-co [https://perma.cc/J68P-6DYV].  
142 This stands in contrast to a situation where an SSO adopts a standard that incorporates 
a patented invention without the participation of the patentholder. In that case, the 
patentholder would not have to license its SEP on FRAND terms, and a court should not 
hold that the patentholder is obligated to license.  
143 Delrahim makes similar arguments when he—incorrectly—tries to equate antitrust 
liability for FRAND deception with compulsory licensing. See infra notes 180–84 and 
accompanying text. 
144 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, 
and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
469, 490 (2009). 
145 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 7 (“That is also true even where a patent holder 
never allegedly intended to license on the terms that a court ultimately determines are 
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commitment may create a duty under contract law to fulfill that 
obligation,” but not an antitrust duty because “Section 2 . . . is agnostic 
to the price that a patent-holder seeks to charge after committing to 
such a term.”146 Delrahim also asserts that “having undertaken a 
contractual duty to charge ‘nondiscriminatory’ rates, the Sherman Act 
does not compel a patent-holder to abide by this promise.”147 
Any references to the general antitrust rule that a lawful monopolist 
can legally charge a monopoly price, however, are irrelevant in the 
context of FRAND deception. The FRAND violator is not a lawful 
monopolist if it used deception in the standard-setting process to 
acquire its monopoly power. Further, the patentholder’s improper 
demand for non-FRAND royalties is not merely a monopolist charging 
a monopoly price, as Delrahim would like to characterize it. The 
charging of a monopoly royalty is evidence of the initial deception. If 
the SEP owner never charges a non-FRAND royalty, this demonstrates 
that its representations to the SSO members during the standard-setting 
process were honest and sincere. If, however, the SEP owner disregards 
its FRAND commitment and engages in patent holdup after the 
standard has been adopted and becomes entrenched, this suggests that 
the monopolist may have lied to the SSO in order to acquire monopoly 
power. Delrahim does not recognize the antitrust significance of 
the deception because, as he repeatedly states, he is not particularly 
bothered by patentholders lying to SSOs in order to manipulate the 
standard-setting process.148  
Not only does Delrahim not appreciate that deception can constitute 
monopoly conduct, Delrahim astonishingly speaks in praise of 
deception. For example, he asserts that no  
antitrust duty spring[s] into being if a patent holder allegedly 
“deceives” an SSO when it commits to license on FRAND terms and 
its participants rely on that representation in deciding to adopt the 
technology. That is because Section 2 should not condemn a patent 
‘FRAND.’”); see also Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 144, at 492 (noting that recent case 
law has rendered antitrust claims involving deviations from FRAND commitments 
inactionable). 
146 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 7. Delrahim is wrong to suggest that the price 
that the SEP owner charges is irrelevant to Section 2 entirely. The royalty rate demanded in 
excess of the FRAND level provides the measure for antitrust damages. 
147 Id. at 8. Delrahim also asserts that “[t]he Sherman Act is indifferent to price 
discrimination . . . .” Id. That is not completely accurate. When a monopolist engages in 
price discrimination by using high prices in one market to subsidize below-cost prices in 
another market, this predatory pricing scheme can violate the Sherman Act. See Christopher 
R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1697–98 (2013).
148 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
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holder’s profit-maximizing intentions or aspirations at the time it 
makes a FRAND commitment . . . .149  
In other words, in Delrahim’s antitrust worldview, deception is not 
blameworthy as long as it is done in pursuit of monopoly profits.150 
Delrahim apparently finds it to be perfectly natural for “the holder 
of a standard-essential patent [who] knew upfront precisely what price 
would satisfy the vague definition of ‘FRAND’ . . . to demand a 
much higher price after the SSO incorporated its technology into 
a standard.”151 At a minimum, Delrahim downplays the fact of 
deception; at a maximum, he embraces it. In either case, the presence 
of deception negates his argument that patentholders have an unfettered 
right under antitrust law to charge monopoly prices. 
4. Summary
Despite his praise for the rights of patentholders, Delrahim does
not seem to truly comprehend the fact that the constitutional and 
statutory rights of patentholders do not include any right to deceive 
SSOs in order to manipulate the standard-setting process. Nor does the 
patentee’s bundle of rights include the right to breach its contractual 
commitments with immunity from antitrust scrutiny. Because 
deception and breach are the core components of FRAND violations, 
Delrahim’s forays into the general rights of patent owners are largely 
an attempt to distract from the bad conduct of certain monopolist 
patentholders. 
B. Scare Tactics
In addition to expanding the rights of patentholders beyond 
recognition, Trump’s antitrust head has also penned a litany of horrors 
that he claims will befall the American economy if antitrust law were 
to serve as a check on FRAND violations. In particular, Delrahim raises 
the twin threats of reduced innovation and compulsory licensing. Both 
sets of arguments are overwrought and inaccurate.  
149 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 10. 
150 He notes that the antitrust’s acceptance of deception is appropriate “particularly 
where remedies are already available to an unhappy licensee or SSO participant.” Id. This 
is a reference to his embrace of contract law, which is discussed later. 
151 Id. (emphasis added). He thinks this is fine because it can be sorted out later in 
contract litigation, but contract law is not a suitable replacement for antitrust law in these 
circumstances. See infra notes 191–210 and accompanying text. 
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1. Innovation
In his speeches, Delrahim tries to create the specter of antitrust
liability destroying innovation incentives if FRAND violations are 
treated as anticompetitive conduct.152 In particular, Delrahim argues 
that, even in the presence of FRAND commitments, courts should grant 
injunctions against alleged infringers in order to “optimize[] the 
incentive[s] to innovate for the benefit of the public.”153 At times, he 
asserts that allowing owners of FRAND-encumbered SEPs to enjoin 
manufacturers from making products is necessary to reward 
inventors.154 This is counterintuitive. Allowing patentholders to evade 
their contractual commitments made to SSOs does not “reward[] 
successful inventors,” as Delrahim argues.155 Rather, it distorts the 
competitive process through which the standard was initially adopted, 
which was based on the patentholders’ representations that they would 
charge FRAND royalties.156 Moreover, there is nothing in patent law 
that suggests—let alone mandates—that patentholders should be able 
to maximize their profits by any means they choose.157 
Delrahim repeatedly describes FRAND violators as “innovators” 
and suggests that this characterization alone warrants antitrust 
immunity, lest liability deter or discourage inventors from inventing.158 
But this is a red herring, a distraction. If a patentholder monopolizes a 
market solely through its innovation, and nothing else, the monopoly is 
legal. But no one is suggesting that monopolization through innovation 
should trigger antitrust liability. Rather, it is a patentholder’s deception 
and/or breach of relied-upon commitments that leads to antitrust 
scrutiny, because neither of these bad acts represents competition on 
152 Delrahim, Thinking About Tomorrow, supra note 141 (“Any additional deterrence 
that the Sherman Act could offer risks curbing procompetitive conduct and reducing 
innovation . . . .”). 
153 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 5. 
154 Id. at 6 (“Since injunctions against infringement frequently do serve the public 
interest in maintaining a patent system that incentivizes and rewards successful inventors 
through the process of dynamic competition, enforcement agencies without clear direction 
otherwise from Congress should not place a thumb on the scale against an injunction in the 
case of FRAND-encumbered patents.”) (emphasis in original). 
155 Id. 
156 Delrahim implicitly assumes that all innovators will be found liable for antitrust 
violations. But that’s simply not the case. 
157 Leslie, supra note 127, at 831; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 300 
(1948) (“The original context of the words [in United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 
490 (1926)] makes clear that they carry no implication of approval of all a patentee’s 
contracts which tend to increase earnings on patents . . . .”). 
158 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 12. 
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the merits.159 Delrahim asserts that acquiring market power “as a result 
of a patent holder’s so-called ‘deception’ about its licensing obligations 
. . . is not the sort of market-power-enhancing conduct that Section 2 
should reach because a cause of action for treble damages would 
impede the policies underlying the Sherman Act.”160 Delrahim never 
really explains why monopolization-through-deception is not conduct 
that violates Section 2. Instead, he expresses concern that patentholders 
may be liable for treble damages.161 But treble damages are easy to 
avoid: if the monopolist patentholder does not engage in deception and 
honors its FRAND commitments, then it will not be on the hook for 
any damages. In a similar vein, Delrahim notes that “the Supreme Court 
has cautioned against antitrust standards that would create an 
unacceptable risk of ‘false positives’ or condemnations of lawful 
pro-competitive conduct.”162 Invoking that concern, Delrahim asserts 
that holding innovators liable for their misconduct could deter 
innovation.163 That is absurd. Liability for misconduct deters 
misconduct. It does not deter any lawful behavior that is not the basis 
for liability in the first place. Delrahim offers no explanation for why 
holding patentees liable for breaking their FRAND commitments after 
having deceived an SSO into incorporating their patented invention 
into a standard would be likely to produce “false positives” against 
patentholders who have not engaged in such behavior.164 
Delrahim consistently fails to appreciate how easy it is for an SEP 
owner to avoid antitrust liability: license the patent on FRAND terms. 
If there is a dispute about what constitutes a FRAND royalty, the 
159 See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
160 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 11. 
161 Id. at 12. 
162 Id. at 5. Delrahim asserts that 
recognizing a Section 2 cause of action for violations of a FRAND commitment 
would create an unacceptable risk of “false positive” condemnations of pro-
competitive conduct by licensees. The prospect of antitrust liability and treble 
damages for breaching a potentially vague FRAND term—or allegedly 
“misrepresenting” one’s intentions to offer some FRAND rate—threatens to chill 
incentives for innovators to develop new technologies that fuel dynamic 
competition. 
Id. at 11. 
163 See id. at 6. 
164 Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 
1336 (2015) (“Participants on both sides of the IP debates are increasingly staking out 
positions that simply do not depend on evidence at all. That is, their response to evidence 
that doesn’t accord with their beliefs is not to question their beliefs, or even to question the 
evidence, but to retreat to a belief system that doesn’t require evidence at all.”). 
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patentholder can go to court and get a ruling on the FRAND rate, 
instead of suing for an injunction and threatening to drive a 
manufacturer from the market. Seeking and following judicial 
guidance on the FRAND rate immunizes the SEP owner against both 
antitrust liability and a breach of contract lawsuit. 
Some of Delrahim’s innovation arguments read like a defense of 
patent holdup writ large. For example, he asserts, “An antitrust duty to 
license on FRAND terms would also contravene the patent laws’ policy 
of promoting innovation by offering incentives for holders of valid 
patents to seek the greatest rewards possible for their inventions.”165 
Taken at face value, this approach would eliminate antitrust liability for 
any patentholders’ anticompetitive conduct (tying, sham litigation, 
etc.) because such liability would reduce the maximum possible return 
they could earn on their patent.166 Delrahim’s statement ignores the 
fact that the patentholder acquired its monopoly power by legally 
promising not “to seek the greatest rewards possible for [its] 
invention[].”167 
Furthermore, Delrahim is wrong to assert that antitrust liability for 
willful misconduct weakens incentives for innovation. The patentee is 
receiving just compensation under the FRAND regime.168 By 
bargaining to have its patent included in the industry standard, the SEP 
owner is locking in a steady stream of profits. Delrahim provides no 
evidence that these FRAND royalties are insufficient to reward and 
encourage innovation. And, in any event, the patentholder chose to 
pursue FRAND royalties rather than maintaining its patent outside the 
standard and retaining the right to set its own royalty rate for its 
patented technology.  
To make his innovation-based arguments, Delrahim describes a 
binary world in which firms are either innovators or implementers, and 
the “dueling interests of innovators and implementers always are in 
tension.”169 If this were a tug-of-war match, Delrahim would be loudly 
rooting for the innovators. Delrahim does not merely champion 
innovators; he affirmatively disparages implementers and the work of 
165 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
166 See Leslie, supra note 127, at 824.  
167 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
168 See Joint Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 8 (“DOJ and USPTO strongly support 
the protection of intellectual property rights and believe that a patent holder who makes such 
a F/RAND commitment should receive appropriate compensation that reflects the value of 
the technology contributed to the standard.”). 
169 Delrahim, Take It to the Limit, supra note 3, at 3. 
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standard-setting organizations, which he accuses of having been “given 
too little scrutiny when they have acted as a forum to slow down, rather 
than to facilitate, the adoption of disruptive innovations.”170  
The development of advanced technological goods, however, is not 
a zero-sum game in which one team wins and the other team loses. 
Delrahim’s description of the relationship between innovators and 
implementers is deeply flawed because no clear line separates these 
groups. In response to his first deception-forgiving speech, a group 
of leaders in the high-tech industry wrote to Delrahim, “We are not 
mere implementers of standards. Rather, we contribute technologies to 
standards and drive research, development, investment and innovation 
throughout the value chain.”171 Signatories to the letter included Apple, 
Audi, Cisco Systems, Dell, Hewlett Packard, Intel, Microsoft, and 
Samsung—all major players in the innovation game. In short, Delrahim 
is wrong to suggest that implementers are not innovators and that 
recognizing their legal rights would somehow hurt innovation.172  
Moreover, Delrahim ignores an entire class of (undisputed) 
innovators—those inventors who own patented technology that was not 
included in the adopted standard. Unchosen standards are often rife 
with innovations. When a patent owner engages in deception to secure 
a particular standard, the innovators who own patents that would have 
been SEPs for an alternative standard that was not selected due to 
another patentee’s deceptive conduct suffer a loss of revenue that could 
constitute a form of antitrust injury. 
Not only is Delrahim’s innovation analysis incorrect, it is 
counterproductive to its stated goals. The industry letter in response to 
Delrahim’s first speech explained that the Trump appointee’s approach 
would “instead threaten US industry and consumer interests, harm 
US innovation, and interfere with parties’ right to contract.”173 The 
Department of Justice used to recognize this, noting in its prior 
joint statement with the PTO that “F/RAND commitments may 
also contribute to increased follow-on innovation by allowing 
nondiscriminatory access to networks both to new entrants and to 
170 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 2. 
171 Letter from Industry to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Jan. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Industry Letter], https://cdn.patentlyo.com/media/2018/07/ 
Letter-from-Industry-Jan-24-annotated.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S96-VED9]. 
172 See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 2120 (“Allowing SEP owners to engage 
in such opportunism would inhibit innovation and the adoption of new technologies by 
implementers, which are often significant innovators themselves.”). 
173 Industry Letter, supra note 171, at 1. 
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established market participants to introduce new generations of 
network-operable devices.”174 Patent holdup harms innovation by 
discouraging firms from participating in SSOs because “[w]here 
the danger of abuse undermines the collaborative process by 
threatening to extract supracompetitive prices from competitors, 
industry members are less likely to participate in SSOs in the future 
and, as a result, consumers are less likely to benefit from these 
organizations.”175 Douglas Melamed and Carl Shapiro have explained 
that “supracompetitive pricing by SEP holders increases the cost of 
follow-on inventions that build on or improve the technologies claimed 
by the SEPs. This cost acts as a tax on follow-on innovation, reducing 
such innovations and impairing the very process of invention that the 
patent laws are intended to promote.”176 Moreover, because Delrahim 
looks at the issue only through the eyes of the SEP owner that seeks to 
evade its FRAND obligation, he overlooks the fact that by delaying the 
implementation of the standard, the holdout who commits holdup hurts 
all the other innovators who have SEPs.177 Ultimately, because SSOs 
facilitate and reward innovation and because patent holdup can chill 
industry members from participating in the standard-setting process, 
the failure to deter and remedy patent holdup harms innovation.178 
Former FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny explained that “[b]y 
protecting the integrity of the standard-setting process itself, sound 
antitrust enforcement actually strengthens market opportunities for 
new technologies, thus improving the incentive for valuable 
innovation.”179 Thus, while Delrahim is right to praise innovation, he 
174 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 5. 
175 Adam Speegle, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse of the Standard-Setting 
Process, 110 MICH. L. REV. 847, 852 (2012) (“[T]he costs of patent holdup inflicted on 
industry members, both in litigation and in royalty payments, draw funding away from 
research and development and, in extreme cases, may drive some companies out of 
business.”) (internal citations omitted). 
176 Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 2116. 
177 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“Hold-up by one SEP holder also harms other firms that hold 
SEPs relating to the same standard because it jeopardizes further adoption of the standard 
and limits the ability of those other holders to obtain appropriate royalties on their 
technology.”). 
178 In re Dell Comput. Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 618 (1996); Michel, supra note 14, at 889 
(“Such licensing fees can also deter innovation by increasing the costs and uncertainty of 
other innovators and by discouraging adoption of standards.”); Delrahim, New Madison, 
supra note 3, at 5. 
179 McSweeny, supra note 23, at 6 (“The motivation for firms to engage in holdup will 
endure where there is opportunity. Given the importance of standard-setting to the modern 
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is wrong to argue that permitting deception and FRAND violations is 
the correct way to encourage innovation. 
2. Compulsory Licensing
In most of his speeches, Delrahim tries to create the illusion that
allowing antitrust claims based on monopolization through FRAND 
deception would constitute compulsory licensing. For example, in his 
New Madison speech, he asserted that “because a key feature of patent 
rights is the right to exclude, standard setting organizations and courts 
should have a very high burden before they adopt rules that severely 
restrict that right or—even worse—amount to a de facto compulsory 
licensing scheme.”180 Delrahim made this claim more explicitly in his 
Telegraph Road speech, asserting that a FRAND commitment should 
not prevent patentholders from securing preliminary injunctions 
against any manufacturers who refuse to meet the patentee’s royalty 
demands because “[a] FRAND commitment does not and should not 
create a compulsory licensing scheme.”181 In his most recent speech, 
Wild West, Delrahim argued that acquiring monopoly power by lying 
to an SSO should not create antitrust liability because “the Sherman 
Act does not convert FRAND commitments into a compulsory 
licensing scheme.”182 
The “compulsory licensing” label is trotted out as a bogeyman 
of sorts. Delrahim invokes the phrase that “FRAND is not a 
compulsory licensing scheme” to mean that the SEP owner who has 
obligated itself to charging a FRAND royalty is, somehow, under no 
such obligation because that would constitute “compulsory licensing.” 
This misconstrues the concept of compulsory licensing beyond 
recognition. A compulsory license describes the scenario in which an 
IP owner is forced to license its IP—generally on terms that the IP 
owner played no role in setting—despite never agreeing to do so. This 
description does not depict a FRAND commitment. 
Delrahim’s statement that a “FRAND commitment does not . . . 
create a compulsory licensing scheme” is correct, but not for the 
reasons he thinks. Delrahim argues that the FRAND commitment 
should not obligate the SEP owner to issue any licenses because that 
economy, it is imperative that the FTC continue to take holdup seriously and not abdicate 
its antitrust enforcement mission in this area.”). 
180 Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 3, at 5. 
181 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 6. 
182 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 10. 
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would constitute a “compulsory licensing scheme.” That is incorrect. 
The SEP owner does have a legal obligation to license its patent, not 
because of any “compulsory licensing scheme,” but because the 
patentholder has voluntarily—and legally—obligated itself to license 
its patents to all licensees on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. 
Thus, a FRAND obligation looks nothing like a compulsory license 
because the patent owner has voluntarily agreed to it.183  
Under the Delrahim approach, all contractual obligations are 
“compulsory” because after the parties have voluntarily entered into 
their contract, they are compelled to honor their commitments. That is 
not what compulsory means, not in general and not in the context of 
compulsory licensing. Delrahim seems to be trying to harness the 
patent community’s reflexive distaste toward compulsory licensing by 
suggesting that enforcing voluntary FRAND commitments would 
amount to compulsory licensing. It is a linguistic sleight of hand that 
should have no currency.  
C. The Non-Antitrust Feint
As his final tactic, Delrahim argues that antitrust liability for 
FRAND violations is unwise and unnecessary because other areas of 
law are better suited for the task of enforcing FRAND commitments. 
The two bodies of law that he routinely invokes are patent law and 
contract law. This section presents Delrahim’s arguments and explains 
why neither patent law nor contract law can perform the same vital 
functions as antitrust law when it comes to deterring and remedying 
monopolization through FRAND deception. 
1. Patent Law
Delrahim argues strenuously that the issue of FRAND violations
should be dealt with through patent law, not antitrust law. For example, 
in his December 2018 Stanford speech, in which he argued against 
antitrust liability for monopolization through FRAND deception, 
183 See Joint Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 5 (“SDOs and their members rely on 
these voluntary F/RAND commitments to facilitate the bilateral licensing negotiations 
. . . .”). 
In an actual compulsory licensing regime, the patentholder cannot escape licensing 
requirements by declining to participate in the regime. In contrast, the patentholder member 
of an SSO had the ex ante option of not participating in the standard-setting process or not 
making a FRAND commitment. But it chose to voluntarily limit its post-standard freedom 
to charge a non-FRAND royalty in exchange for the SSO considering its inclusion in the 
industry standard. 
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Delrahim started with the premise that “[w]hen it comes to the test for 
obtaining injunctive relief against infringement, patent law already 
strikes a careful balance that optimizes the incentive to innovate, for 
the benefit of the public.”184 He proceeded to champion the legal test 
from eBay v. MercExchange,185 which provides that  
a patent holder seeking an injunction must demonstrate (1) it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.186
Delrahim praised the eBay test for “allow[ing]” courts “to consider 
effects in the market, including (as Justice Kennedy noted in 
concurrence) how significant the patented invention is to the use of the 
product, and whether the patent holder can be properly rewarded for 
that contribution without the ability to exclude competitors.”187 It is 
interesting that Delrahim described the eBay test as merely allowing 
courts to consider these issues and not requiring them to do so. He 
concluded that the eBay “test is used to maintain appropriate incentives 
to innovate, it thus facilitates the goals of antitrust law and patent law 
alike.”188 
Delrahim’s embrace of the eBay test as a replacement for antitrust 
scrutiny—and as embodying antitrust goals—is unpersuasive. First, the 
eBay test has nothing to do with antitrust law, and the Supreme Court 
never considered antitrust issues in this non-antitrust case. The eBay 
Court never intended its test for patent injunctions to replace antitrust 
law as a remedy for monopolization through FRAND deception (or 
other anticompetitive uses of a patent). 
Second, the eBay test did not consider the factual context in which 
the patentholder has already committed itself to licensing all 
manufacturers on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. Douglas 
Melamed and Carl Shapiro have explained that the eBay test cannot 
solve the problem of patent holdup occurring in violation of FRAND 
commitments because “[w]hile the eBay case has limited the 
184 Delrahim, Telegraph Road, supra note 3, at 5. 
185 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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availability of injunctions in infringement cases involving SEPs, it has 
not eliminated that possibility or the bargaining leverage that the 
prospect of an injunction can confer upon SEP holders in royalty 
negotiations with infringers.”189 In other words, the eBay test is not 
designed to address the pursuit of injunctions by SEP owners who have 
leverage arising from the fact that they made a FRAND commitment 
that they now seek to avoid. 
Moreover, the eBay standard counsels against granting injunctions 
to patentholders who have made FRAND commitments. Suzanne 
Michel has explained that the patentee’s promise to charge a FRAND 
royalty “provides strong evidence that denial of an injunction and 
[payment of] ongoing royalties will not irreparably harm the 
patentee.”190 Thus, the first eBay factor is not satisfied. With regard to 
the second factor, adequacy of legal remedies, Michel argues, “A court-
ordered payment of ongoing royalties can ensure that the patentee 
receives the full value of the invention and protect incentives to 
innovate.”191 The balance of equities and hardships, the third eBay 
factor, favors the standard implementers over the patentholders 
because the latter are engaging in patent holdup, threatening to 
drive alleged infringers from the markets even if they are willing to 
pay a FRAND royalty.192 Finally, the public interest factor inquiry 
favors denial of injunctions to patentees who have made FRAND 
commitments because allowing injunctions in these circumstances 
facilitates patent holdup, which ultimately harms consumers and 
innovation.193 
Third, like patent law itself, the eBay test does not provide for any 
remedy for misconduct by the patentholder. Patent law is neither 
189 Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 2123. 
190 Michel, supra note 14, at 908 (citing Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 
F. Supp. 2d 951, 983–85 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic
Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560–61 (D. Del. 2008)).
191 Id. 
192 Id. (“As a key part of this analysis, courts should consider whether an infringer may 
face significant hardship as a result of an injunction if it is impossible to participate in the 
market without complying with the standard.”) (citing Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 609 F. 
Supp. 2d at 984–85); TruePosition, Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 532–33 (D. 
Del. 2008)). 
193 Michel, supra note 14, at 910 (“Courts should also consider whether grant of an 
injunction would deprive consumers of interoperable products and threaten to undermine 
the collaborative innovation that can result from the standard-setting process. Courts should 
also consider whether an injunction awarded against a standard would result in higher prices 
to consumers resulting only from holdup of the standard and not the value of the 
technology.”); see supra notes 22–26 (discussing consumer harm caused by patent holdup) 
and notes 156–65 (discussing innovation harms from patent holdup).  
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intended nor designed to compel patentholders to honor their 
contractual relations. Most of the patent statute is concerned with the 
standards for patentability, the process of securing patents, and the 
enforcement of patents, not constraining the actions of patentees.194 
Although some patent doctrines, such as inequitable conduct, penalize 
certain misconduct by a patent applicant committed during the 
application process, FRAND violations have nothing to do with the 
patent application process. Instead, the misdeeds happen after the 
patent has been issued.  
Patent law’s only major post-issuance constraint on a patentee’s 
misconduct is the equitable doctrine of patent misuse.195 To date, 
however, courts have held that FRAND violations do not constitute 
patent misuse.196 Moreover, patent law does not provide monetary 
remedies to those who are injured by the misconduct of 
patentholders.197 Antitrust remedies are needed to penalize patent 
holdup, in part because antitrust remedies can deter misconduct in ways 
that patent law does not.198 
In sum, arguments that antitrust law is unnecessary or inappropriate 
to address the issue of FRAND violations because patent law is better 
equipped to handle the problem are flawed. Such vague gestures toward 
patent law betray a lack of understanding about this body of law and its 
ability to corral misconduct by patentees. 
2. Contract Law
In most of his speeches, Delrahim contends that SEP owners who lie
about FRAND commitments in order to have their patented technology 
included in a standard should be immune from antitrust liability 
because contract law can better address the problem.199 The arguments 
194 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–329 (2012). 
195 In theory, equitable estoppel can police some forms of post-issuance bad conduct and 
the doctrine could be applied to FRAND violations. See Doug Lichtman, Understanding the 
RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2010) (“Courts could interpret RAND 
as a public commitment that creates a defense of equitable estoppel.”). 
196 Saint Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 2:15-CV-351-JRG, 
2018 WL 915125, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2018) (“[A] breach of FRAND is not 
determinative of patent misuse.”). 
197 Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation 
Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1275–76 (2009). 
198 Id. 
199 Delrahim, Take It to the Limit, supra note 3, at 8–9; Delrahim, Thinking About 
Tomorrow, supra note 141, at 3 (“[C]ontract law is available and adequate to remedy such 
conduct.”).  
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that he makes to support this position reveal that Delrahim has no 
interest in remedying or deterring FRAND fraud. 
In litigation involving FRAND violations, the core of the plaintiff’s 
case is the same under either a contract law approach or an antitrust law 
approach. The same conduct—charging a supra-FRAND royalty—is 
the foundation of both a breach of contract and an antitrust violation. 
Besides the fact that Section 2 liability requires proof of a defendant’s 
monopoly power, the two most important differences are the remedies 
and the universe of potential plaintiffs. With respect to remedies, under 
contract law, if the patentee charges a royalty that is not FRAND, 
the contract plaintiff can recover the difference between the FRAND 
amount and the royalty actually paid. In contrast, successful antitrust 
plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages on the overcharge as well as 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.200 These differences in available 
remedies have important implications for both compensation and 
deterrence. Although called compensatory damages, the single 
damages associated with contract law do not actually fully compensate 
victims of breach for their injuries. Although contract damages are 
supposed to make the nonbreaching party whole, they do not for several 
reasons. First, contract law does not generally provide attorneys’ 
fees for successful plaintiffs.201 Second, contract remedies do not 
compensate the nonbreaching party for the time and effort of 
investigating their contract claims.202 As a result, even when a plaintiff 
wins her contract law case, she is not fully compensated for her injuries. 
She remains worse off than if the contract had been properly 
performed.  
Congress provided for the automatic trebling of antitrust damages in 
order to deter firms from engaging in anticompetitive conduct in the 
200 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
201 Personalized Media Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-824-CAP, 
2011 WL 13174439, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2011) (“An award of attorneys’ fees in 
a breach of contract action is governed by the American Rule, under which the litigating 
parties shoulder their own litigation expenses unless an exception applies.”), vacated, 
493 F. App’x 78 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Pursuit Partners, LLC v. Reed Smith, LLP, No. 
FSTCV155015213S, 2018 WL 1882738, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2018) (“The cited 
authorities appear to stand for the unremarkable proposition that a party cannot assert a claim 
for attorneys fees incurred in connection with pursuing the breach of contract action itself. 
In effect, it is nothing more than a contractual-focused assertion of the so-called ‘American 
rule’ whereby each litigant bears litigation expenses, absent a statute or contract (or other 
recognized basis) shifting that liability.”). 
202 See John M. Bjorkman, Minnesota and the American Rule: The Recoverability of 
Attorneys’ Fees Following In re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 541, 543 (2003). 
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first place.203 Antitrust law’s treble damages are also intended to 
compensate victims of antitrust violations for the time it takes to 
investigate and pursue potential antitrust violations.204 Congress 
recognized that consumers would be less likely to spend the necessary 
resources to detect and challenge antitrust violations if they were not 
compensated for their investment in time. Although contract law alone 
does not deter patentholder deception and holdup,205 Delrahim praises 
contract remedies specifically because contract law does not provide 
for treble damages.206 He raises the threat of overdeterrence if antitrust 
law were in play. But there should be no meaningful risk of 
overdeterrence because the owner of a SEP can eliminate the prospect 
of antitrust litigation by adjudicating FRAND royalty rates ahead of 
time. 
After disparaging antitrust law for allegedly providing too potent a 
remedy, Delrahim claims that antitrust immunity for FRAND 
violations somehow strengthens contract law as a remedy. In one of his 
more bizarre arguments, Delrahim asserts that “refraining from 
imposing antitrust penalties gives teeth to more appropriate common 
law remedies and allows SSOs to live up to their promise.”207 Delrahim 
never explains how shifting from a treble-damage remedy to a single-
damage remedy “gives teeth” to the latter beyond forcing those harmed 
by a FRAND violation to pursue a single-damage contract claim rather 
than a treble-damage antitrust claim. Delrahim’s assertion is patently 
203 See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982) 
(“[Antitrust law’s] treble damages were also designed to deter future antitrust violations.”). 
204 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (“Congress created the treble-
damages remedy . . . precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust 
violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources 
available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring 
violations.”); Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 
(D.N.J. 1940) (“[T]he three-fold damage clause of the Sherman Act, was designed to supply 
an ancillary force of private investigators to supplement the Department of Justice in law 
enforcement . . . .”); see also Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc., 456 U.S. at 575–76 (“[In 
antitrust,] treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of 
compensating victims.”). 
205 Farrell et al., supra note 22, at 660 (“Proper enforcement of FRAND terms may 
restore the competitive outcome but is unlikely to deter attempts at hold-up.”). 
206 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that FRAND violations “may 
warrant remedies under contract law, but the important difference is that contract remedies 
do not involve the threat of treble damages”). 
207 Delrahim, Take It to the Limit, supra note 3, at 9 (“In a breach of contract action, a 
party can litigate the facts regarding what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ or ‘nondiscriminatory’ 
rate or commitment. If there is a violation of a reasonableness standard, the factfinder can 
decide it, like they do in other instances of contract violations.”). 
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false; he has no desire to strengthen contract remedies or claims based 
on FRAND violations. 
While claiming to champion contract law as a mechanism to remedy 
FRAND violations, Delrahim seemingly seeks to simultaneously 
undermine any plaintiff’s FRAND-related contract case. For example, 
he phrases the issue as “FRAND commitments that patent-holders 
unilaterally make to standard setting organizations.”208 He 
mischaracterizes the patent owner’s promise as unilateral, which is 
important because contract law requires a bargained-for exchange. If 
the defendant’s promise is truly unilaterally made, as Delrahim asserts, 
there is no contract and, thus, no breach of contract claim for refusing 
to license at a FRAND royalty. Delrahim, however, is wrong to 
describe the patentholder’s promise as unilateral, because the 
patentholder is not making the commitment as a donative gift but rather 
as part of an exchange in which the patentholder is bargaining for the 
SSO to consider including its patented technology in the standard.209 
The Second Circuit has explained that because SSOs will omit 
technologies that are subject to patent holdup, “[F]RAND licenses are 
thus part of a quid pro quo, representing the consideration contributing 
parties give to standard-setting organizations in exchange for the 
competitive benefits they will receive from gaining industry-wide 
acceptance of their preferred technologies.”210 This is a two-way, 
bargained-for exchange, not a one-way promise that falls short of a 
legal contract. 
Ultimately, Delrahim’s embrace of contract law as a remedy to 
FRAND violations is telling. This position concedes that the FRAND 
violator is breaching contractual obligations, which is not competition 
on the merits.211 Delrahim’s goal seems to be to replace a powerful 
remedy with a more anemic one that will allow the patentholder to 
engage in patent holdup, which, again, Delrahim seems to praise when 
championing contract law over antitrust law:  
Where contract law remedies exist to remedy and deter breaches of a 
FRAND commitment, the additional deterrence that Sherman Act 
remedies offer could deter lawful, pro-competitive conduct—that is, 
208 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis added). 
209 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 
2012). 
210 Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2014). 
211 Delrahim seems to acknowledge that the patentholder is ignoring its legal 
obligations. See Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 2 (“I would like to elaborate further 
on why an antitrust cause of action premised on a failure to abide by FRAND commitments 
would be inconsistent with Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”). 
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research and development by innovators who make careful cost-
benefit calculations as to how much to invest in technologies that may 
not pay off. Demanding a high price for one’s patented technology is 
permissible, and expected, conduct in a free market negotiation.212  
With this statement, Delrahim has shown his hand. He does not think 
that there is anything wrong with patentholders demanding exorbitant 
royalties, even when they have committed to charging a FRAND 
royalty in exchange for having their patented technology included in a 
standard. Moreover, he mischaracterizes contract law as being 
about deterrence, when it is not.213 Among the three bodies of law 
discussed as potential remedies for FRAND violations—antitrust law, 
patent law, and contract law—only antitrust law is designed to punish 
and deter anticompetitive misconduct by patentee-monopolists who 
disregard their FRAND commitments. And punishing a patentholder 
for deceptively entering into and subsequently abandoning a FRAND 
commitment does not deter a patentholder from either conducting 
research and development or from demanding a high price for patented 
technology that is not subject to a FRAND commitment. 
CONCLUSION 
The role of antitrust law in high-technology markets is one of the 
most hotly contested current debates among antitrust scholars, 
practitioners, and enforcement officials at the highest levels of antitrust 
enforcement. Whether the use of deception and breach of contract to 
monopolize a market and demand monopoly royalties violates antitrust 
law should not be controversial. Trump’s Assistant Attorney General, 
Makan Delrahim, seems to think anything done by a patentholder is 
necessarily pro-competitive; he even describes bargaining by an SEP 
owner for a higher-than-FRAND royalty as “pro-competitive.”214 He 
doesn’t condemn deception; he rationalizes it. This is an unfortunate 
change from the days of bipartisan support for wise and measured 
212 Id. at 12. 
213 Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555 (E.D. Ky. 2012) 
(“Unlike in tort law, the purpose of damages in contract law is not deterrence and 
punishment.”); Smith v. NBC Universal, 524 F. Supp. 2d 315, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“[D]eterrence is not a goal of contract law . . . .”). 
214 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 13 (“For purposes of Section 2, ‘FRAND’ is 
not sufficiently clear to allow courts to distinguish between lawful, pro-competitive 
bargaining conduct that patent rights allow and unlawful, anticompetitive licensing conduct 
that harms consumers without offering pro-competitive benefits.”). 
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antitrust policy. In 2017, Tim Muris, a Republican-appointed former 
Chair of the FTC, observed the following: 
Under Republicans and Democrats, the antitrust agencies have 
pursued anticompetitive conduct. Despite disagreement on particular 
cases and on the underlying theory under which cases should 
proceed, there is widespread agreement on the importance of the 
issue [of patent holdup] and its suitability as an appropriate subject 
for antitrust enforcement.215  
Delrahim has used his series of speeches to implore courts to weaken 
antitrust doctrine in this area.216 Courts should decline Delrahim’s 
invitation.  
There was a time when the Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division thought it was wrong to monopolize a market through deceit 
and breach of contract. It is important to create a record of the flawed 
arguments made by the current administration, so that eventually—and 
hopefully soon—we can return to that earlier time. 
215 TIMOTHY J. MURIS, BIPARTISAN PATENT REFORM AND COMPETITION POLICY 12 
(Am. Enter. Inst. 2017), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Bipartisan-Patent-
Reform-and-Competition-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G9M-6LKF]. 
216 Delrahim, Wild West, supra note 3, at 14 (“Statements of policy alone, however, do 
not change the law immediately. Courts themselves will be called upon to do the hard work 
of applying the principles of the Sherman Act in the context of genuine legal disputes.”). 
